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AN INTUITIONISTIC FORMULA HIERARCHY
BASED ON HIGH-SCHOOL IDENTITIES
TAUS BROCK-NANNESTAD AND DANKO ILIK
To the memory of Kosta Dosˇen
Abstract. We revisit the notion of intuitionistic equivalence and formal proof
representations by adopting the view of formulas as exponential polynomials.
After observing that most of the invertible proof rules of intuitionistic (min-
imal) propositional sequent calculi are formula (i.e. sequent) isomorphisms
corresponding to the high-school identities, we show that one can obtain a
more compact variant of a proof system, consisting of non-invertible proof
rules only, and where the invertible proof rules have been replaced by a for-
mula normalisation procedure. Moreover, for certain proof systems such as
the G4ip sequent calculus of Vorob’ev, Hudelmaier, and Dyckhoff, it is even
possible to see all of the non-invertible proof rules as strict inequalities between
exponential polynomials; a careful combinatorial treatment is given in order
to establish this fact. Finally, we extend the exponential polynomial analogy
to the first-order quantifiers, showing that it gives rise to an intuitionistic hi-
erarchy of formulas, resembling the classical arithmetical hierarchy, and the
first one that classifies formulas while preserving isomorphism.
1. Introduction
Classical logic has a standard semantics independent of the notion of proof. One
could for instance do model theory without ever involving proof systems. However,
the intended meaning of the logical connectives for intuitionistic logic makes its
semantics inherently proof-theoretic. For example, the intuitionistic validity of
F ∨G amounts to either having a proof of F or a proof of G.
Equivalence of formulas is perhaps also more subtle intuitionistically. First,
whereas in classical first-order logic any formula can be characterised as belonging
at an appropriate level of the arithmetical hierarchy through an equivalent formula
in prenex form, in intuitionistic logic, the existence of an equally versatile hierarchy
appears to be elusive (see Section 5). Second, the usual notion of equivalence
denoting implication in both directions is not semantics-, that is, proof-preserving.
For instance, the equivalence F ∧F ↔ F only allows preserving proofs between the
left-hand side and the right-hand side for some special cases of F , but, when F is
a disjunction with both disjuncts provable, there would be four different possible
proofs of the left-hand side and only two different possible proofs of the right-hand
side.
Isomorphism of formulas seems to be a better notion when our aim is to preserve
semantics across an equivalence. This strong notion of equivalence of formulas,
F ∼= G,
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asks not only that F ↔ G, but also that there exist proof transformations φ : ⊢
F −→ ⊢ G and ψ : ⊢ G −→ ⊢ F , such that given any proof D1 of F and D2 of G,
we have that
ψ(φ(D1)) ≡ D1 and φ(ψ(D2)) ≡ D2.
However, adopting isomorphism as the standard intuitionistic notion of equivalence
makes us stumble upon another fundamental problem: having a good definition of
identity of proofs, “≡”, is itself open since the early days of intuitionistic proof
theory (see [1] and Section 5).
For all of these reasons, the study of formal proof systems is perhaps more press-
ing for intuitionistic logic and constructive mathematics, than it is for classical
mathematics. And, as constructive reasoning plays an important role in proof as-
sistant software, these problems are also directly relevant to formal specification and
verification of programs, not to mention the foundations of popular mathematical
theories with intuitionistic cores, such as type theory and topos theory.
In this paper, we contribute to the intuitionistic proof theory related to the
aforementioned problems by means of the perspective of intuitionistic formulas
seen as exponential polynomials1. The paper is organised as follows.
In Section 2, we shall show that the invertible proof rules of sequent calculi for
intuitionistic (minimal) propositional logic present simple isomorphisms that arise
from high-school identities, and that hence one can build a high-school variant (HS)
of a sequent calculus, which is complete for provability, but does not need to contain
invertible proof rules. Such a calculus HS is thus a way to obtain a proof system
for intuitionistic (minimal) logic that relies on the non-invertible rules only; this,
for example, can facilitate comparing two proofs for identity.
Furthermore, we show that one can have an intuitionistic sequent calculus that
allows an interpretation of non-invertible rules as in-equalities between exponen-
tial polynomials. This is shown on the example of Vorob’ev, Hudelmaier, and
Dyckhoff’s sequent calculus G4ip [2, 3], in Section 3, opening the possibility to
use arithmetical or analytic arguments in intuitionistic proof theory; we give an
application to termination of proof search.
In Section 4, we shall show how the analogy between formulas and exponential
polynomials can be extended to the first-order quantifiers, obtaining a normal form
for intuitionistic first-order formulas and a novel intuitionistic “arithmetical” hier-
archy that preserves formula isomorphism, and hence identity of proofs. We believe
that the proposed hierarchy is a technical device that could play a roˆle similar to
that of the arithmetical hierarchy for classical logic (which exists since the 1920s),
as it is both simple and semantics-preserving.
Finally, Section 5 summarises the results and discusses related work.
2. Proof Rules as Equalities
Identifying formulas of intuitionistic (minimal) propositional logic with exponen-
tial polynomials – by writing F ∧G as FG, F ∨G as F +G, F → G as GF , and ⊤
as 1, and treating atomic formulas as variables – allows one to generalise the notion
of validity of equations in the standard model of positive natural numbers by the
1As opposed to ordinary polynomials where the exponent is only allowed to be a constant,
for exponential polynomials the exponent can contain variables or indeed another exponential
polynomial.
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notion of formula isomorphism. Namely, if we take F ∼= G as defined in Section 1,
the following implication holds (see [4] for a proof):
F ∼= G =⇒ N+  F = G.
That is, if F and G are isomorphic formulas, then the corresponding arithmetical
expressions must be equal for the variables contained therein interpreted over the
positive natural numbers.
Equation validity (and consequently formula isomorphism) poses interesting meta-
theoretic problems that go back to Tarski’s High-School Identity Problem (see
[5, 4, 6]). In particular, validity (and isomorphism) is not finitely axiomatisable:
there is no finite set of equality axioms Ax that is sufficent to derive every valid
equation (isomorphism), i.e. such that N+  F = G =⇒ Ax ⊢ F = G.
Nevertheless, this meta-theoretic problem does not concern us in this paper,
since for the purpose of analysing intuitionistic equivalence (the formula hierarchies
presented later) and proof systems, we do not need to have a complete character-
isation of isomorphism, but merely certain isomorphisms provable from the twelve
high-school identities (HSI axioms):
F = F (1)
F +G = G+ F (2)
(F +G) +H = F + (G+H) (3)
FG = GF (4)
(FG)H = F (GH) (5)
F (G+H) = FG+ FH (6)
F1 = F (7)
F 1 = F (8)
1F = 1 (9)
FG+H = FGFH (10)
(FG)H = FHGH (11)
(FG)H = FGH . (12)
That is, when we close these axioms under appropriate equality and congruence
rules (see for instance [6]), we can talk about formal derivability of an equation,
HSI ⊢ F = G, for which we have:
HSI ⊢ F = G =⇒ F ∼= G. (*)
Every equation derivable from the HSI axioms can thus be also seen as establishing
a strong intuitionistic equivalence.
This correspondence between formulas and exponential polynomials suggests an
investigation of the rules of intuitionistic proof systems as rules for transforming
exponential polynomials. Let us start with the invertible2 rules of the intuitionistic
2For the purpose of this paper, we adopt a stronger notion of invertibility than the one usual
in structural proof theory. We not only require that the premise is provable from the conclusion,
but moreover that the premise and the conclusion are isomorphic as formulas (sequents). This
stronger notion of invertible rule is also known as an asynchronous rule in the terminology of
focusing sequent calculi [7]. However, the impact of the terminology change is mild: the only
proof rule from the paper which is invertible in the classic sense but not in ours is (→P
l
).
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propositional sequent calculus, written out in two columns, the left one giving a
rule in formula notation, while the right one gives the same rule in exponential
polynomial notation.
F,Γ ⊢ G
Γ ⊢ F → G
GFΓ
(GF )
Γ
(→r)
Γ ⊢ F Γ ⊢ G
Γ ⊢ F ∧G
FΓGΓ
(FG)Γ
(∧r)
F,Γ ⊢ H G,Γ ⊢ H
(F ∨G),Γ ⊢ H
HFΓHGΓ
H(F+G)Γ
(∨l)
F,G,Γ ⊢ H
(F ∧G),Γ ⊢ H
HFGΓ
HFGΓ
(∧l)
While we used the traditional symbols “⊢” and comma for the formula (sequent)
notation, one should keep in mind that for us the “⊢” is just an implication (im-
plication being right-associative, we could have written for instance Γ ⊢ F → G as
Γ→ F → G), while the comma is just a conjunction.
We can thus see that the usual invertible rules of intuitionistic sequent calculi
correspond to polynomial simplification rules. And, since these last ones are either
instances or compositions of high-school identities, by (*) the invertible proof rules
are also valid as formula-, that is, sequent isomorphisms. The same is true for
the additional invertible rules sometimes present, such as the ones of the sequent
calculus G4ip [2, 3]:
(F → G→ H),Γ ⊢ I
(G ∧ F → H),Γ ⊢ I
I(H
G)FΓ
IHGFΓ
(→∧l )
(F → H), (G→ H),Γ ⊢ I
(F ∨G→ H),Γ ⊢ I
IH
FHGΓ
IHF+GΓ
. (→∨l )
In order to express a complete version of the intuitionistic sequent calculus in
terms of exponential polynomials, we need to consider the non-invertible proof rules
as well. In particular, it suffices to consider the remaining rules of G4ip:
P,Γ ⊢ P PPΓ
(axiom)
Γ ⊢ F
Γ ⊢ F ∨G
FΓ
(F +G)Γ
(∨1r)
Γ ⊢ G
Γ ⊢ F ∨G
GΓ
(F +G)Γ
(∨2r)
F, P,Γ ⊢ G
(P → F ), P,Γ ⊢ G
GFPΓ
GFPPΓ
(→Pl )
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(G→ H),Γ ⊢ F → G H,Γ ⊢ I
((F → G)→ H),Γ ⊢ I
(GF )H
GΓIHΓ
IHG
F Γ
, (→→l )
where P denotes a prime (i.e. atomic) formula.3
Due to the absence of contraction in G4ip, all of the non-invertible rules F
G
satisfy
the arithmetic inequality F ≤ G when variables are interpreted in {n ∈ N | n ≥ 2}.
We shall prove this in Section 3, since the case of (→→l ) is not obvious.
The goal for the present section is to derive from G4ip a proof system that does
not contain any of the (bureaucratic and non-informative, from the identity of proofs
perspective) invertible rules. This system, written with the help of exponential
polynomial notation is called the high-school variant of G4ip (HS). Proofs in HS
only consist of the translations of the informative rules of G4ip. However, that the
procedure for deriving HS is generic, and could be performed on another version of
the intuitionistic sequent calculus.
The starting idea is to use the analytic transformation,
GF = eF logG = exp(F log(G)),
in order to decompose binary exponentiation (i.e. implication) in terms of unary
exponentiation and the logarithmic function, just as the approach to normal forms
in exponential fields [9].4
As already analysed in a previous study of the βη-equations for terms of nor-
malised type [10], the exp-log decomposition of implication leads to a normal form
of propositional formulas that is obtained by left-to-right rewriting using the high-
school identities (isomorphisms) (10), (11), (12), and (6).
There is some liberty in determining the order in which to apply the equations.
One precise and structurally recursive procedure for computing the normal form
of a formula (i.e. sequent), ‖−‖, suitable for establishing Theorem 2.3, is given in
Figure 15. It maps any formula to an isomorphic formula from the class of exp-
log normal forms (E), defined by the mutually inductively defined classes of base
formulas (B), conjunctions (C), and disjunctions (D):
B ∋ b ::= p | d
C ∋ c ::= (c1 → b1) ∧ · · · ∧ (cn → bn) (n ≥ 0)
D ∋ d ::= c1 ∨ · · · ∨ cn (n ≥ 2)
E ∋ e ::= c | d,
that is,
B ∋ b ::= p | d E ∋ e ::= c | d
3We do not give a special treatment for intuitionistic absurdity, or negation; ⊥ would be treated
as an atomic proposition as any other, and ¬ would be replaced by implication into ⊥. Note that
the identification of ⊥ with the polynomial 0 would be problematic, since in the presence of 0 the
simple correspondence between isomorphism and equation validity that we use breaks (see [4]).
Note also that even in such a setting known as minimal logic [8], one can recover the proof rule ex
falso quodlibet as soon as some form of induction axiom is present (see, for instance, Section 7.1.3
of [8]).
4This hints at interpreting implication “classically”, that is, in terms of two distinct “negation”
symbols, ¬exp and ¬log, such that
F → G := ¬exp(F ∧ ¬logG),
but we do not pursue this superficial analogy further in this paper.
5This is a mathematical notation for the procedures formalised in [11] and also used in [10].
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C ∋ c ::=
n≥0∏
i=1
bcii D ∋ d ::=
n≥2∑
i=1
ci,
where p denotes a prime formula. The variables p, b, c, d, e, possibly with indexing
subscripts, will always be used to stand for members of the corresponding class.
The unit 1 (i.e. the formula ⊤) is not a prime formula, but rather denotes the
nullary product
∏0
i=1 b
ci
i .
The formal definitions from Figure 1 are a mathematical notation for definitions
implemented [11] using the Coq proof assistant. The function ‖−‖ is defined simul-
taneously with the |−|-function, whose purpose is to guarantee the desired ordering
of HSI’s, i.e. that equation (6) is not applied at the base of exponentiation before
equation (11). It uses operations ⊕ , × , ⋉ , ⋊ , ⇑ , and ↑ . The intuition behind
these operations is as follows.
The function ⊕ turns a binary plus (disjunction) into an n-ary one, more
precisely, it flattens a tree of binary +-constructors into a tail-inductive list, i.e. a
list with all the +-s associated to the right, c1 + (c2 + (c3 + (· · · + cn))). The
function × does the analogous thing for multiplication (conjunction).
The functions ⋉ and ⋊ apply the left, correspondingly right, distributivity law.
They are meant to implement the following informal equations:
p⋉ d = p11⋊ d c⋊ p = cp11(
n∑
i=1
ci
)
⋉ d =
n∑
i=1
(ci ⋊ d) c⋊
n∑
i=1
ci =
n∑
i=1
cci.
Finally, the functions ⇑ and ↑ normalise exponentiations following (10), (11) and
(12), in order for the following informal equations to hold:
b ↑ p = bp
111 b11 ⇑ e = b ↑ e
b ↑
n∑
i=1
ci =
n∏
i=1
bci
(
n≥0∏
i=1
bi
ci
)
⇑ e =
n≥0∏
i=1
(bi ↑ (ci ⋊ e)) .
In order to prove the main theorem of this section, Theorem 2.3, we shall need to
establish Lemma 2.2 on formal equalities, where “=” denotes multiset equality of
terms, or, more precisely, we will have the formal equality bc11 · · · b
ci
i · · · b
cj
j · · · b
cn
n =
bc11 · · · b
cj
j · · · b
ci
i · · · b
cn
n , for any 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. We use multiset equality because it
allows us to work modulo commutativity and associativity of multiplication (con-
junction), and as it is in common usage when presenting sequent calculi.
But, we first point out that the normalization function ‖−‖ provides a way to
classify propositional formulas while preserving isomorphism.
Theorem 2.1. For every propositional formula F , there is an isomorphic formula
e ∈ D ∪ C, where the classes D, C, and B are defined simultaneously as follows,
D ∋ d ::= c1 ∨ · · · ∨ cn (n ≥ 2)
C ∋ c ::= (c1 → b1) ∧ · · · ∧ (cn → bn) (n ≥ 0)
B ∋ b ::= p | d,
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B ∋ b ::= p | d C ∋ c ::= 1 | bc1c2
D ∋ d ::= c1 + c2 | c + d E ∋ e ::= c | d
−⊕− : E → E → D
c1 ⊕ e2 := c1 + e2
(c11 + c12)⊕ e2 := c11 + (c12 + e2)
(c11 + d12)⊕ e2 := c11 + (d12 ⊕ e2)
−×− : C → C → C
1× c2 := c2
bc11c12 × c2 := b
c11(c12 × c2)
−⋊− : C → E → E
c1 ⋊ c2 := c1 × c2
c1 ⋊ (c21 + c22) := (c1 × c21) + (c1 × c22)
c1 ⋊ (c21 + d22) := (c1 × c21) + (c1 ⋊ d22)
− ↑ − : B → E → C
b ↑ c := bc1
b ↑ (c1 + c2) := (b
c11)× (bc21)
b ↑ (c1 + d2) := (b
c11)× (b ↑ d2)
− ⇑ − : C → E → C
1 ⇑ e2 := 1
bc11c12 ⇑ e2 := (b ↑ (c11 ⋊ e2))× (c12 ⇑ e2)
−⋉− : E → E → E
c1 ⋉ e2 := c1 ⋊ e2
(c11 + c12)⋉ e2 := (c11 ⋊ e2)⊕ (c12 ⋊ e2)
(c11 + d12)⋉ e2 := (c11 ⋊ e2)⊕ (d12 ⋉ e2)
‖−‖ : Formula→ E |−| : Formula→ C
‖p‖ := p11 |p| := p11
‖F ∨G‖ := ‖F‖ ⊕ ‖G‖ |F ∨G| := (|F | ⊕ |G|)11
‖F ∧G‖ := ‖F‖⋉ ‖G‖ |F ∧G| := |F | × |G|
‖F → G‖ := |G| ⇑ ‖F‖ |F → G| := |G| ⇑ ‖F‖
Figure 1. Formula normalization functions
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or, in exponential polynomial notation:
D ∋ d ::=
n≥2∑
i=1
ci C ∋ c ::=
n≥0∏
i=1
bcii B ∋ b ::= p | d,
where p denotes a prime formula.
Proof. Given F , the required e is ‖F‖. The normalization procedure defined in
Figure 1 is structurally recursive, hence terminating, and with range D ∪ C.
Isomorphism between F and ‖F‖ holds as a consequence of (*), because the
equations defining the normalization procedure in Figure 1 are just instances or
simple consequences of the HSI: to see this, it suffices to replace the symbols ×, ⋉
and ⋊ by multiplication, ⊕ by addition, b ↑ e by be, c ⇑ e by ce, and ‖F‖ and |F |
by F . 
Lemma 2.2. The following equations hold for the normalization functions defined
in Figure 1:
c× 1 = c (13)
c1 × (c2 × c3) = (c1 × c2)× c3 (14)
d⊕ (e2 ⊕ e3) = (d⊕ e2)⊕ e3 (15)
e1 ⊕ (e2 ⊕ e3) = (e1 ⊕ e2)⊕ e3 (16)
c⋊ (d⊕ e) = (c⋊ d)⊕ (c⋊ e) (17)
c⋊ (e1 ⊕ e2) = (c⋊ e1)⊕ (c⋊ e2) (18)
(d⊕ e1)⋉ e2 = (d⋉ e2)⊕ (e1 ⋉ e2) (19)
(e0 ⊕ e1)⋉ e2 = (e0 ⋉ e2)⊕ (e1 ⋉ e2) (20)
1⋊ e = e (21)
c1 ⋊ (c2 ⋊ d) = (c1 × c2)⋊ d (22)
c1 ⋊ (c2 ⋊ e) = (c1 × c2)⋊ e (23)
c⋊ (d⋉ e) = (c⋊ d)⋉ e (24)
c⋊ (e1 ⋉ e2) = (c⋊ e1)⋉ e2 (25)
d⋉ (e1 ⋉ e2) = (d⋉ e1)⋉ e2 (26)
e1 ⋉ (e2 ⋉ e3) = (e1 ⋉ e2)⋉ e3 (27)
c ⇑ 1 = c (28)
(c1 × c2) ⇑ e = (c1 ⇑ e)× (c2 ⇑ e) (29)
b ↑ (d⊕ e) = (b ↑ d)× (b ↑ e) (30)
b ↑ (e1 ⊕ e2) = (b ↑ e1)× (b ↑ e2) (31)
b ↑ (e1 ⋉ e2) = (b ↑ e1) ⇑ e2 (32)
c ⇑ (e1 ⋉ e2) = (c ⇑ e1) ⇑ e2 (33)
c ⇑ (e1 ⊕ e2) = (c ⇑ e1)× (c ⇑ e2) (34)
c ⇑ ((e1 ⊕ e2)⋉ e3) = (c ⇑ (e1 ⋉ e3))× (c ⇑ (e2 ⋉ e3)) (35)
Proof. The proofs proceed as follows: (13) by induction on c; (14) by induction on
c1; (15) by induction on d; (16) by case analysis on e1, e2, e3 and using (15); (17) by
induction on d; (18) by case analysis on e1, e2 and using (17); (19) by induction on
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p ↑ (p⋊ e)
(axiom)
c1 ⇑ e
(c1 + c2) ↑ e
(∨1r)
c2 ⇑ e
(c1 + c2) ↑ e
(∨2r)
c ⇑ (‖F‖⋉ (p⋊ e))
c ⇑ ((|F | ⇑ p)⋊ (p⋊ e))
(→Pl )
((|G| ⇑ e1) ⇑ ((|H | ⇑ ‖G‖)⋊ e2))× (c ⇑ (‖H‖⋉ e2))
c ⇑ ((|H | ⇑ (|G| ⇑ e1))⋊ e2)
(→→l )
Figure 2. Proof rules of the High-school sequent calculus (HS) for G4ip
d and using (16); (20) by case analysis on e1, e2 and using (19); (21) by induction
on e; (22) by induction on d and using (16); (23) by case analysis on e and using
(22) and (16); (24) by induction on d and using (18) and (23); (25) by case analysis
on e1 and using (24) and (23); (26) by induction on d and using (20) and (25);
(27) by case analysis on e1 and using (25) and (26); (28) by induction on c and
using (13); (29) by induction on c1 and using (14); (30) by induction on d; (31) by
induction on e1 and using (30); (32) by induction on e1 and using (13) and (31);
(33) by induction on c and using (29), (32), and (25); (34) by induction on c and
using (18) and (31); (35) by using (20) and (34).
It may be interesting to notice that in fact (34) and (35) are the only cases where
the multiset nature of the equality is needed – it is needed because it implies the
associativity and commutativity of “×”. For all of the other cases, it suffices to
have the definitional (intensional) equality on ordered sequences (lists), which is the
equality that we worked with in the Coq formalisation. The remark is interesting
for us, because it pinpoints which sequent calculi proof rules exactly need to work
with multisets: as can be seen from the proof of Theorem 2.3, these rules are (∨l)
and (→∨l ). 
Armed with a precise and terminating transformation of formulas, we can now
state the HS variant of G4ip in Figure 2. For prime formulas p, we make a harmless
abuse of notation by writing just p instead of p11 when an argument of type C is
expected by an operation.
Notice that our calculus consists of non-invertible rules only, tagged with the
tag of the G4ip rule they correspond to (to be shown in Theorem 2.3 below). The
rules (→Pl ) and (→
→
l ) mention usual formulas F,G,H . This is done on purpose,
so that the correspondence to G4ip rules is as tight as possible. If one wants to
mention only formulas from the normalised classes, one can consider the following
reformulations of the rules,
c ⇑ (∂c0 ⋉ (p⋊ e))
c ⇑ ((c0 ⇑ p)⋊ (p⋊ e))
(→Pl ’)
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((c2 ⇑ e1) ⇑ ((c1 ⇑ ∂c2)⋊ e2))× (c ⇑ (∂c1 ⋉ e2))
c ⇑ ((c1 ⇑ (c2 ⇑ e1))⋊ e2)
, (→→l ’)
where ∂ denotes the map |F | 7→ ‖F‖ that distributes the product over the sums of
the form (c1+ · · ·+ cn)
1 in |F |; here, the exponent 1 is used to suspend normaliza-
tion, that is, permit the isomorphism (11) to be applied before (6) at the base of
exponentiation.
Note also, that one can make the normalization functions disappear from any
concrete proof in HS notation, so one could adopt the view that the functions are
there merely for a compact presentation of the rules. For instance, considering the
case of the (→→l )’-rule from HS, where c := p
11, c1 := p
11, c2 := q
11, e1 := r
11,
e2 := s
11, and p, q, r, s are prime formulas, we retrieve just the corresponding G4ip
rule in polynomial notation,(
qr
1pq
11s111
)
×
(
pp
1s111
)
ppq
r111s111
,
or the more readable one, by the harmless abuse of notation for prime formulas
mentioned earlier (c := p, c1 := p, c2 := q, e1 := r, e2 := s) and by omitting the
trailing 1:
qrp
qspps
ppq
r
s
.
For a concrete example of the rules involving disjunction, consider the case where
c1 := p, c2 := q, e := r + s, and the concrete instance of the (∨
1
r) rule:
prps
(p+ q)
r
(p+ q)
s .
We now show in which sense HS is a version of G4ip. This will also imply that
HS is a proof system complete for intuitionistic provability.
Theorem 2.3. Every derivation of F in G4ip can be transformed to a derivation
of ‖F‖ in HS.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the derivation. The premises are connected
by “×”. At each case, we first apply (13) and (21) of Lemma 2.2 to slightly
simplify the involved expressions. Then, the non-invertible rules, (axiom), (∨1r),
(∨2r), (→
P
l ), and (→
→
l ), are directly proven by their HS correspondent rule. As
for the invertible rules, there is no need to use HS rules to interpret them, because
applying the normalization function ‖−‖ on formulas is enough, more precisely:
• (→r) is proven by (33);
• (∧r) is proven by (29);
• (∧l) is proven by (27);
• (∨l) is proven by (35);
• (→∧l ) is proven also by (33);
• and, (→∨l ) is proven by (34) (and (27)).

Although it may appear to be complex to transform G4ip proofs to HS proofs,
when one wants to formally apply the normalization functions of Figure 1, this
transformation is actually quite easy and can be efficiently also performed by hand
using high-school arithmetic. We give an example to show how it works.
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Example 2.4. The following G4ip derivation of r ∧ (q → (r ∨ t)→ s)→ q → s,
sqrss
t axiom
sqrs
rst
(→Pl )
sqrs
r+t
(→∨l )
sqr(s
r+t)
q (→
P
l )
(sq)
r(sr+t)q
(→r)
is mapped to the following HS derivation:
sqrss
t axiom
sqrs
rst
(→Pl )
sqrs
rqstq
(→Pl )
.
We end this section by establishing in the following Theorem 2.5 that HS can be
seen as a fragment of G4ip, one that is complete for provability even if it does not
contain invertible proof rules. As a corollary, by composition of Theorem 2.3 and
Theorem 2.5, one gets that all G4ip proofs can be mapped into a fragment of G4ip
proofs, this mapping being proof-identity-preserving.
Theorem 2.5. Suppose that HS proves the formula c.
Let a denote the formula that is obtained from an expression a using the symbols
{⋉,⋊,+, ‖·‖ , |·| , ↑ , ⇑ }, by replacing ⋉ and ⋊ by ∧, + by ∨, ‖I‖ and |I| by I,
j ↑ k by k → j, and j ⇑ k by k → j.
Then G4ip proves the formula c.
Proof. This can be proved formally by induction on the derivation, but the trans-
lation is straightforward: one keeps in G4ip essentially the same tree of proof rules
from HS, but replaces the premise p and conclusion c by the premise p and conclu-
sion c.
That means in particular that, when c is in one of the possible forms p ↑ (p⋊ e),
or (c1 + c2) ↑ e, or c ⇑ ((|F | ⇑ p)⋊ (p⋊ e)), or c ⇑ ((|H | ⇑ (|G| ⇑ e1))⋊ e2), then c
is correspondingly of form p∧ e→ p, or e→ (c1 ∨ c2), or (p→ F ) ∧ (p ∧ e)→ c, or
((e1 → G)→ H) ∧ e2 → c. 
3. The Inequality Interpretation of Proof Rules
In this section, we show that the inference rules for G4ip can be interpreted
as inequalities relating the exponential polynomials corresponding to the premises
and the conclusion. This extends the previous observation that invertible rules are
equalities.
We start by exploring the inequality interpretation of G4ip, in order to keep the
presentation somewhat simple. The main result is the following.
Theorem 3.1. Let R be an inference rule of G4ip. If the variables F,G,H, I, P
are interpreted to be natural numbers strictly greater than 1, then the value of the
premise of the rule is less than or equal to the value of the conclusion. Moreover,
the inequality is strict if and only if R is not invertible.
Note that for inference rules with multiple premises, we take the interpretation
to be the product of the interpretations of the individual premises.
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Remark 3.2. We should clarify that our notion of invertibility differs slightly from
that of Dyckhoff. In [2], the (→Pl ) rule is considered invertible, as any proof of
(P → F ), P,Γ ⊢ G may be transformed into a proof of F, P,Γ ⊢ G. From our point
of view, however, the (→Pl ) rule is not invertible, because we consider invertibility
to be a property of formulas rather than rules. Given the sequent (P → F ),Γ ⊢ G,
we may be able to decompose P → F immediately, or we may not, depending
on whether P is present in the context Γ. Because we cannot guarantee that the
formula can be decomposed, we consider the rule to be non-invertible.
A different way of seeing this is to consider the following formulation of the (→Pl )
rule:
F,Γ ⊢ G P ∈ Γ
(P → F ),Γ ⊢ G
(→Pl
′
)
This rule is equivalent to the usual rule, and it is straightforward to convert be-
tween proofs using the former rule and proofs using the latter. Note, however, that
this rule is not invertible in the traditional sense. While a proof of the conclusion
certainly implies that there exists a proof of the first premise, this is not the case
for the second premise.
To present the inequality interpretation, we define an interpretation function [[−]]
that maps formulas and contexts to natural numbers. The function is defined as
follows:
[[F ∨G]] = [[F ]] + [[G]] [[F ∧G]] = [[F ]] · [[G]]
[[G→ F ]] = [[F ]][[G]] [[Γ, F ]] = [[Γ]] · [[F ]]
[[P ]] = 2 [[⊤]] = [[·]] = 1
Note that with this interpretation, we have the following property:
Lemma 3.3. If [[F ]] = 1 then F ∼= ⊤.
Proof. By a straightforward induction on the structure of formulas. 
This observation justifies our assumption that when we apply an inference rule,
the variables involved must have a value greater than or equal to 2. For instance,
consider the (→→l ) rule. Here, we could have F,G,H = P , Γ = ·, and I = ⊤, which
would result in the following interpretation:
(22)2
2·1 · 12·1
122
2
·1
Clearly, the premise has a greater value than the conclusion, hence the inequality
interpretation does not work, unless we assume all the variables (except the one
corresponding to Γ) have values not less than 2.
Note, however, that this is an entirely reasonable assumption given the content
of Lemma 3.3. If I = ⊤, there is no reason to apply the (→→l ) rule, as we already
know ⊤ is provable6. Thus, we assume that the formulas and contexts in question
have been subjected to the following simplification rules first:
⊤ ∧ F  F F ∧ ⊤  F
6In fact, modern presentations of G4ip [3] omit ⊤ as a formula entirely, as it — from a proof
search perspective — is completely superfluous.
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⊤ → F  F F → ⊤  ⊤
Γ,⊤  Γ
These simplifications correspond to the high-school identities (7), (8), and (9). Note
that we do not need to reduce occurrences of ⊤ inside disjunctions, as [[F ∨G]] ≥ 2
for all formulas F,G. This leads to the following lemma:
Lemma 3.4. For all formulas F , either [[F ]] ≥ 2 or F  ∗ ⊤.
Proof. By induction on the structure of F . We show here a representative case. If
F = G → H , we apply the induction hypothesis to H . If H  ∗ ⊤, then F  ∗ ⊤
by the definition of  . If not, we have [[H ]] ≥ 2, and thus
[[G→ H ]] = [[H ]][[G]] ≥ 2[[G]] ≥ 2,
by using the fact that [[H ]] ≥ 2 and [[G]] ≥ 1 respectively. 
Alternatively, one can simply replace all occurrences of ⊤ with any formula with
a unique proof, such as P → P for some fresh atomic formula P .
In the rest of this section, we will omit the interpretation function, as it will be
obvious from the context whether we are talking about the formula or the interpre-
tation to which it is mapped.
Let us now return to the inference rules of G4ip. The fact that the invertible
rules preserve the value of the sequents is immediate by inspection of the inference
rules. For instance, for the (∨l) rule, we would need to show that
H(F+G)Γ = HFΓHGΓ,
but this is a simple arithmetical equality. This leaves the matter of establishing
the non-invertible rules as strict inequalities. For the (∨1r) and (∨
2
r) rules, this is
immediate, as F +G > F and F +G > G whenever F,G ≥ 1.
For the (→Pl ) rule, since we do not apply rules that do nothing after the sim-
plification, we have that F 6 ∗ ⊤ and thus F ≥ 2. As P is an atomic formula, its
interpretation is 2, and thus
FP = F 2 > F and hence
GF
PPΓ > GFPΓ by monotonicity.
This leaves the inequality associated to the (→→l ) rule, for which we will need a
few lemmas first:
Lemma 3.5. If the inequality 2H
GF −H > GFH
G
holds for all G,H, F ≥ 2, then
IH
GF Γ > (GF )H
GΓIHΓ for all F,G,H, I ≥ 2 and Γ ≥ 1.
Proof. We reason as follows:
2H
GF −H > GFH
G
by assumption.
IH
GF −H > GFH
G
as I ≥ 2.
I(H
GF −H)Γ > GFH
GΓ by raising each side to the power Γ.
IH
GF Γ−HΓ > GFH
GΓ by distributivity.
IH
GF Γ > GFH
GΓIHΓ by multiplying with IHΓ.
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IH
GF Γ > (GF )H
GΓIHΓ by the high-school identity.

Next, we need a few further lemmas in order to discharge the assumption in the
preceding lemma:
Lemma 3.6. The following inequalities hold for G ≥ 2:
∀F ≥ 1
(
2G
F+1
− 2G
F
≥ 2G
2
− 2G
)
∀F ≥ 2
(
2G
F+1
− 2G
F
≥ 2G
3
− 2G
2
)
.
Proof. Both statements are proved by induction on F , and for both induction cases
it is enough to have the following inequality, for F ≥ 1:
2G
F+2
− 2G
F+1
≥ 2G
F+1
− 2G
F
,
that is,
2G
F+2
≥ 2G
F+1+1 − 2G
F
.
We can actually prove the stronger statement
2G
F+2
≥ 2G
F+1+1
by using the monotonicity of the log2 function, since log2 2
GF+2 = GF+2, log2 2
GF+1+1 =
GF+1 + 1, and because
GF+2 ≥ GF+1 + 1
clearly holds when G ≥ 2. 
Lemma 3.7. Given F,H ≥ 2 and G ≥ 3, the following inequalities hold:
GF −G− 1 ≥ GF−1 (36)
2G
F−1
≥ FG (37)
FHGG ≥ FHG−1G+ 1 (38)
Proof. To prove (36), we reason as follows:
GF−2 ≥ G2−2 = G0 = 1 as F ≥ 2.
3GF−2 − 1 > GF−2 as 3n− 1 > n when n ≥ 1.
GF−1 − 1 > GF−2 as G ≥ 3.
GF −G > GF−1 by multiplying with G.
GF −G ≥ GF−1 + 1 as G,F ∈ N.
GF −G− 1 ≥ GF−1 by rearranging.
Next, to prove (37), we do this in two steps: First, we note that the inequality
holds when F = 2. To show this, we need to show that 2G
2−1
= 2G ≥ 2G, that
is 2G−1 ≥ G, which is clear when G ≥ 2. Next, we observe that if the inequality
holds for some F , then it also holds with F + 1 substituted in place of F . For the
right hand side of the inequality, this gives a difference of (F +1)G−FG = G. For
the left hand side, we reason as follows:
2G
F
− 2G
F−1
≥ 2G
2
− 2G
2−1
as F ≥ 2 and using Lemma 3.6.
= (2G)G − 2G by the high-school identities.
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≥ (2G)2 − 2G as G ≥ 2.
= 2G(2G − 1)
≥ G as 2G ≥ G and 2G − 1 ≥ 1.
As we have now established that
2G
F
− 2G
F−1
≥ (F + 1)G− FG
for all F ≥ 2, the desired result follows from a straightforward induction on F .
Finally, to establish (38), we reason as follows:
FHG−1G(H − 1) ≥ 1 as F,G,H ≥ 2.
FHGG ≥ FHG−1G+ 1 by rearranging.

We can now establish the final lemma:
Lemma 3.8. For all F,G,H ≥ 2, we have 2H
GF −H > GFH
G
.
Proof. We first prove this in the case where G ≥ 3:
2G
F−1
≥ FG by (37).
2G
F−G−1 ≥ FG as GF −G− 1 ≥ GF−1 by (36).
HG
F−G−1 ≥ FG as H ≥ 2.
HG
F−1 ≥ FHGG by multiplying with HG.
HG
F−1 ≥ FHG−1G+ 1 by (38) and transitivity.
HG
F−1 − 1 ≥ FHG−1G
HG
F
−H ≥ FHGG by multiplying with H .
2H
GF −H ≥ 2FH
GG by monotonicity.
2H
GF −H ≥ (2G)FH
G
by the high-school identity.
2H
GF −H > GFH
G
as 2G > G when G ≥ 2.
This takes care of the case when G ≥ 3. In the case when G = 2, we need to show
the following strict inequality:
2H
2F −H > 2FH
2
First, we will establish the inequality
22
F−2 − F > 1
To do so, we note that it holds when F = 2, and all that is needed, then, is to
establish that the expression 22
F−2 − F is monotonic in F for all F ≥ 2. Looking
at successive differences, we get(
22
F+1−2 − (F + 1)
)
−
(
22
F−2 − F
)
= 22
F+1−2 − 22
F−2 − 1
= (22
F+1
− 22
F
) · 2−2 − 1
≥ (22
3
− 22
2
) · 2−2 − 1 by Lemma 3.6
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= 26 − 22 − 1 > 0
whence the expression is monotonic in F . We can now complete the argument as
follows:
22
F−2 − F > 1 by the preceding argument.
H2
F−2 − F > 1 as H ≥ 2.
H(H2
F−2 − F ) > 1 by multiplying with H .
H2
F−1 − FH > 1 by simplification.
H2
F−1 − 1 > FH by rearranging.
H2
F
−H > FH2 by multiplying with H .
2H
2F −H > 2FH
2
by monotonicity.
This concludes the proof. 
Combining the above lemmas, we now get Theorem 3.1 as a straightforward
consequence.
Using this theorem, we can prove as an easy corollary that proof search using the
rules of G4ip is terminating. Because none of the rules increases the value of the
interpretation of sequents, and because the non-invertible rules strictly decrease this
value, it follows that the number of non-invertible rules in a derivation is bounded
by a function of the value of the goal sequent. Moreover, one can show that there
is at most a finite number of invertible rules between any two non-invertible rules
in a derivation, and the termination of proof search follows easily. Note that, even
in the case ⊥ was considered, because the rule for ⊥ does not have any premises,
its impact on termination would be trivial.
The traditional way of showing G4ip is terminating is also done by assigning
a measure to each sequent, but for this, it is sufficient to show that the measure
decreases along any branch of the proof tree. In our presentation, we have blurred
the distinction between the meta-level conjunction (i.e. multiple premises) and that
of the object level, as motivated by the corresponding equations for exponential
polynomials.
It is natural to consider whether a similar approach would suffice to show the
termination of other calculi, such as the G3ip calculus. In this calculus, the→l rule
has the following form:
(A→ B),Γ ⊢ A B,Γ ⊢ C
(A→ B),Γ ⊢ C
If we assume a, b, c, and γ are the interpretations of A, B, C, and Γ respectively,
then the inequality interpretation would require that
cb
a·γ > ab
a·γ · cb·γ
Even if we ignore the second premise, in order to have cb
a·γ be strictly greater than
ab
a·γ , we must have that c is strictly greater than a. If A and C are both atomic,
this at the very least means that their interpretations must be different, and raises
the question of how one would even determine which values should be assigned to
the atomic formulas.
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However, even a non-uniform interpretation of the atomic formulas would not
suffice because derivations in G3ip may loop: in the presence of an assumption of
the form A → A (or in a more non-trivial case, A → B and B → A) a derivation
of Γ → A may after a few applications of the →l rule return to the exact same
sequent Γ→ A. In this case, the inequality interpretation cannot possibly hold.
Finally, let us briefly remark on how to extend the above result to the HS sequent
calculus. The first step is to note that the normalization functions shown in Figure 1
all preserve the value of the interpretation. Thus, all that is needed is to show
that the inference rules must strictly decrease the associated values. In this case,
however, the necessary inequalities are exactly the ones we established previously,
and as the HS sequent calculus only has non-invertible rules, termination of proof
search is immediate. Note that this again requires all occurrences of ⊤ to have been
simplified away.
4. An Intuitionistic Arithmetical Hierarchy
In classical first-order logic, every formula is equivalent to a formula in prenex
normal form. This is possible thanks to the classical tautologies (for G such that
x 6∈ FV(G)),
∀xF ∨G↔ ∀x(F ∨G) ∃xF ∧G↔ ∃x(F ∧G)
∀xF ∧G↔ ∀x(F ∧G) ∃xF ∨G↔ ∃x(F ∨G)
¬∃xF ↔ ∀x¬F ¬∀xF ↔ ∃x¬F,
that allow pushing the quantifiers to the front of a formula. In intuitionistic logic,
half of these rules are not only equivalences but even isomorphisms. We can also
write them in a more general form7:
∀xF ∧ ∀xG ∼= ∀x(F ∧G) (39)
∃xF ∨ ∃xG ∼= ∃x(F ∨G) (40)
∃xF → G ∼= ∀x(F → G) (where x 6∈ FV(G)). (41)
To see why these isomorphisms hold, it is easiest to consider a natural deduction
proof system, when formal proofs are terms of a suitable typed lambda calculus
(see for instance the intuitionistic fragment of Table 2 from [12]) and take iden-
tity of proofs, ≡, to be the standard =βη-relation for the lambda calculus with
product types (conjunction) and sum types (disjunction). One also has terms for
∃-introduction (〈t, p〉), ∃-elimination (dest p as(x.b) in q), ∀-introduction (λx.p) and
∀-elimination (pt), and additional rules for β- and η-equality of terms for the quan-
tifiers,
(λx.p)t =β p{t/x}
dest 〈t, p〉 as(x.a) in q =β q{t/x}{p/a}
p =η λx.px
p{q/a} =η dest q as(x.b) in p{〈x, b〉/a},
7The generalization consists in replacing the negation ¬H (i.e. the implication H → ⊥) by the
implication H → G, as well as closing G by a universal quantifier which in the case x 6∈ FV(G)
can be discarded.
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that are analogues of the β- and η-rules concerning function types and sum types.
Given this notation, for instance, the isomorphism
∃xF → G ∼= ∀x(F → G)
can be established using two proof terms,
λa.λx.λb.a〈x, b〉 (φ)
λc.λd. dest d as(y.e) in cye, (ψ)
by showing that λc.φ(ψc) =βη λc.c and λa.ψ(φa) =βη λa.a:
(λa.λx.λb.a〈x, b〉)(λd. dest d as(y.e) in cye) =β
λx.λb. dest 〈x, b〉 as(y.e) in cye =β λx.λb.cxb =η c
(λc.λd. dest d as(y.e) in cye)(λx.λb.a〈x, b〉) =β
λd. dest d as(y.e) in a〈y, e〉 =η λd.(aa0){d/a0} = λd.ad =η a
Similarly, we can show that a further formula isomorphism holds,
G→ ∀xF ∼= ∀x(G→ F ), (42)
when x /∈ FV(G). Namely, one can take as witnessing terms the following ones:
λa.λx.λb.abx (φ)
λc.λd.λx.cxd. (ψ)
Given the first-order formula isomorphisms (39), (40), (41), and (42), we shall
now adopt an extended exponential polynomial notation of formulas involving quan-
tifiers. We write ∃xF as xF and ∀xF as F x, the distinction between conjunctions
and existential quantifiers, and implications and universal quantifiers, being made
by a variable convention: we “left-multiply” and “exponentiate” by the lowercase
x, y, z in order to express quantifiers, while if we do it with uppercase F,G, it
means that we are making a conjunction and implication with a generic formula.
Using this notation, the isomorphisms (39)-(42) acquire the form of the following
equations:
(FG)x = F xGx (39’)
x(F +G) = xF + xG (40’)
GxF = (GF )x (where x /∈ FV(G)) (41’)
(F x)G = (FG)x (where x /∈ FV(G)) (42’)
This extension of HSI with rules involving the extended exponential polynomials
thus still implies formula isomorphism. And now we can give an interpretation of
the invertible proof rules involving the quantifiers that respect this notation:
Γ ⊢ F
Γ ⊢ ∀xF
(FΓ)x
(F x)Γ
for all x /∈ FV(Γ) (∀r)
F,Γ ⊢ G
∃xF,Γ ⊢ G
(
GFΓ
)x
GxFΓ
for all x /∈ FV(G,Γ). (∃l)
As the invertible rules are equalities, an extension of HS from Section 2 for the first-
order case can be defined in the same way as before, by applying a normalization
function (see Figure 3) to the premises and conclusions of the non-invertible rules
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for quantifiers. Working with the first-order extension G4i [13] of G4ip, one would
have the HS variants of the rules (L∀), (R∃), (L∀⊃), while the invertible rule (L∃⊃)
can be handled using the isomorphism (41).
We have not pursued formally showing an extension of Lemma 2.2, mostly for
technical reasons having to do with formalizing syntax with binders.8 Hence, we
do not propose to establish formally a first-order analogue of Theorem 2.3 here.
What we consider as a more important consequence of the extended exponential
polynomial interpretation of the quantifiers, is the fact that it leads to a normal form
theorem for intuitionistic (minimal) first-order formulas, which can be thought of
as an analogue of the prenex normal form for classical first-order logic, but which
is obtained by sometimes pushing the quantifiers in (following (39’) and (40’))
and sometimes pushing the quantifiers out (following (41’) and (42’)), rather than
always pushing them out as in the approach for classical logic. Moreover, turning a
formula into our normal form preserves isomorphism between the original formula
and its normal form, and hence also equivalence and proof identity.
Theorem 4.1. For every first-order formula F , there is an isomorphic formula
e ∈ D ∪ C, where the classes D, C, and B are defined simultaneously as follows,
D ∋ d ::= c1 ∨ · · · ∨ cn (n ≥ 2)
C ∋ c ::= ∀x1(c1 → b1) ∧ · · · ∧ ∀xn(cn → bn) (n ≥ 0)
B ∋ b ::= p | d | ∃xc,
where p denotes a prime formula, and x and xi lists of first-order variables (poten-
tially empty).
Proof. Given F , the required e is ‖F‖. The normalization procedure defined in
Figure 1 and Figure 3 is structurally recursive, hence terminating, and with range
D ∪ C.
The isomorphism follows in the same way as in Theorem 2.1, taking into account
the additional isomorphisms proven in this section for (39), (40), (41), and (42),
i.e. the additional high-school identities (39’), (40’), (41’), and (42’). 
Since D ⊂ B, we can also present the normal form in a way analogous to the
classical arithmetical hierarchy.
Definition 4.2. The intuitionistic formula hierarchy is defined by the following
mutually-inductive definition of formula classes Σ and Π,
Π ∋ c ::= ∀x1(c1 → b1) ∧ · · · ∧ ∀xn(cn → bn) (n ≥ 0)
Σ ∋ b ::= p | c1 ∨ · · · ∨ cn | ∃xc (n ≥ 2),
or, in extended exponential polynomial notation,
Π ∋ c ::=
n≥0∏
i=1
(bcii )
xi Σ ∋ b ::= p |
n≥2∑
i=1
ci | xc,
where p denotes a prime formula, and x and xi lists of first-order variables (poten-
tially empty).
8Apart from the fact that we do not use it for formal proofs, the Coq definition of the functions
from Figure 3 is simple and can be used to compute the formula normal form.
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B ∋ b ::= p | d C ∋ c ::= 1 | (bc1)
x1 c2
D ∋ d ::= c1 + c2 | c + d | xc E ∋ e ::= c | d
−×− : C → C → C
1× c2 := c2
(bc11)
x
c12 × c2 := (b
c11)
x
(c12 × c2)
− ↑− − : B → Vars→ E → C
b ↑x ((yc)11) := (bc)
x,y
1
b ↑x c := (bc)
x
1
b ↑x (c1 + c2) := ((b
c1)x1)× ((bc2)x1)
b ↑x (c1 + d2) := ((b
c1)x1)× (b ↑x d2)
− ⇑ − : C → E → C
1 ⇑ e2 := 1
(bc11)xc12 ⇑ e2 := (b ↑
x (c11 ⋊ e2))× (c12 ⇑ e2)
− ∝ − : Vars→ E → D
x ∝ c := xc
x ∝ (c1 + c2) := ((xc1)
1)ǫ1 + ((xc2)
1)ǫ1
x ∝ (c1 + d2) := ((xc1)
1)ǫ1 + x ∝ d2
− − : C → Vars→ C
1 x := 1
((bc1)yc2) 
x := (bc1)y,x(c2 
x)
‖−‖ : Formula→ E |−| : Formula→ C
‖p‖ := (p1)ǫ1 |p| := (p1)ǫ1
‖F ∨G‖ := ‖F‖ ⊕ ‖G‖ |F ∨G| := ((|F | ⊕ |G|)1)ǫ1
‖F ∧G‖ := ‖F‖⋉ ‖G‖ |F ∧G| := |F | × |G|
‖F → G‖ := |G| ⇑ ‖F‖ |F → G| := |G| ⇑ ‖F‖
‖∃xF‖ := x ∝ ‖F‖ |∃xF | := ((x |F |)1)ǫ1
‖∀xF‖ := |F | x |∀xF | := |F | x
Vars is the set of finite lists of first-order variables, denoted by x or y; the empty
list is denoted by ǫ and the concatenation of two lists of variables is denoted by a
comma: x, y.
Figure 3. Extension of the normalization functions from Figure 1
for the quantifiers; xc denotes the existential quantifier ∃xc, while
(bc)x denotes the combination of the universal quantifier and im-
plication ∀x(c → b); the new operations ∝ and  are analogous
to the operations ⋉ and ⇑ but deal with first-order variables
and correspond to the pushing-in of quantifiers from isomorphisms
(40’) and (39’.
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The name “hierarchy” is justified by the fact that the classes Σ and Π are
interleaved, being defined by a truly mutual inductive definition. A lower level
of a class is embedded in the immediately succeeding higher level by the formula
transformations b 7→ (b1)ǫ and c 7→ ǫc, which are clearly isomorphisms (recall that ǫ
denotes the empty list of first-order variables). It should also be clear that a higher
level cannot be embedded in a lower one, but, in order to make these statements
more precise, we define a particular linearization of the hierarchy.
Definition 4.3. The intuitionistic arithmetical hierarchy is defined from the intu-
itionistic formula hierarchy by assigning levels, Σn,Πn, for n ∈ N, to the formula
classes Σ and Π, in the following way:
Π0 ∋ c ::= p
11 p is a prime formula
Σ0 ∋ b ::= p p is a prime formula
Πn+1 ∋ c ::=
m≥0∏
i=1
(bcii )
xi n =
m
max
i=1
{k | bi ∈ Σk}
Σn+1 ∋ b ::=
m≥2∑
i=1
ci | xc n =
m
max
i=1
{k | ci ∈ Πk} or c ∈ Πn.
We also extend the relation “∈” from formulas satisfying the inductive definition
to all formulas, in the following way:
• F ∈ Πn iff ‖F‖ ∈ Πn,
• F ∈ Σn+1 iff ‖F‖ ∈ Σn+1.
Remark 4.4. Note, that, when determining the level n for the class Πn, we do not
take into account the level of the sub-formulas ci from ∀x1(c1 → b1)∧· · ·∧∀xn(cn →
bn), but only the level of the sub-formulas bi.
Remark 4.5. Although, due to the syntactic nature of the previous definition, the
direct inclusions Σn ⊆ Σn+1 and Πn ⊆ Πn+1 do not hold, we do have the
following:
b ∈ Σn implies that there exists b
′ ∈ Σn+1 such that b ∼= b
′; and
c ∈ Πn implies that there exists c
′ ∈ Πn+1 such that c ∼= c
′.
This is proved by induction on n, simultaneously for the two statements, as follows.
Base case. If b ∈ Σ0, then b is of form p, hence b
′ := ǫ(p11) ∼= b and b′ ∈ Σ1
since p11 ∈ Π0. If c ∈ Π0, then c is of form p
11, hence c′ := c ∈ Π1.
Induction case. If b ∈ Σn+1, then b is either of form c1 + · · · + cm or xc, with
n = maxmi=1{k | ci ∈ Πk} or c ∈ Πn. By the induction hypothesis, we find one
c′i ∈ Πn+1 such that ci
∼= c′i, or c ∈ Πn+1 such that c
∼= c′. Then, c1+ · · ·+ ci−1+
c′i+ci+1+· · ·+cm or xc
′ belongs toΣn+2, and c ∼= c1+· · ·+ci−1+c
′
i+ci+1+· · ·+cm or
c ∼= xc′. If c ∈ Πn+1, then c is of form
∏m≥0
i=1 (b
ci
i )
xi with n = maxmi=1{k | bi ∈ Σk}.
By the induction hypothesis, we find one b′i ∈ Σn+1 such that bi
∼= b′i. Then,
c ∼= (bc11 )
x1 · · ·
(
b
ci−1
i−1
)xi−1
((b′i)
ci)
xi
(
b
ci+1
i+1
)xi+1
· · · (bcmm )
xm ∈ Πn+2.
We shall now show a connection between the intuitionistic arithmetical hierarchy
and the classical arithmetical hierarchy. From this connection, it will follow that
the intuitionistic hierarchy is proper, that is, that the interleaving of the classes Σ
and Π is such that each class is properly extended by the next one – the hierarchy
does not collapse.
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4.1. Properness of the intuitionistic hierarchy via a relation to the clas-
sical one. Recall the definition of the classes Σ0n,Π
0
n of the classical arithmetical
hierarchy9 (see for instance Section 2.3 of [8]):
• F ∈ Π0n+1 iff F is classically equivalent to a formula of the form ∀xG where
G ∈ Σ0n,
• F ∈ Σ0n+1 iff F is classically equivalent to a formula of the form ∃xG where
G ∈ Π0n,
• F ∈ Σ00 and F ∈ Π
0
0 iff F is classically equivalent to an elementary relation
E.
Note that, in the classical case, a basic theory of arithmetic is assumed on top
of classical first-order logic, a theory able to code syntax and define Kleene’s T
predicate, in order to show that the hierarchy classifies all formulas and that its
levels are properly increasing. In the intuitionistic case, we did not need to assume
a theory, working with pure intuitionistic first-order logic. We will assume now,
however, that every elementary relation E is given by an atomic predicate with the
same name E.
Say that a formula F is classically represented in Σn (or Πn) when there is
a formula F ′ ∈ Σn (or Πn) such that F and F
′ are classically equivalent. This
means that F itself is not necessarily in Σn or Πn (because ‖F‖ is not there for
the specific n), but that F is classically equivalent to a formula F ′ such that ‖F ′‖
is in Σn or Πn. From this discussion, it is clear that we do not get that Σ
0
n ⊆ Σn
or Π0n ⊆ Πn. However, we do get the following related proposition.
Proposition 4.6. Every formula of the classical arithmetical hierarchy is classi-
cally represented at the corresponding level in the intuitionistic arithmetical hierar-
chy. That is: if F ∈ Σ0n, then F is classically represented in Σn; if F ∈ Π
0
n, then
F is classically represented in Πn.
Proof. If F ∈ Σ00 (i.e., F ∈ Π
0
0), then F is classically equivalent to a predicate
E (and E11), and, since E is prime, E ∈ Σ0 (and E
11 ∈ Π0) and hence F is
classically represented in Σ0 and Π0.
If F ∈ Π0n+1, then F is classically equivalent to a formula of form ∀xG, whereG ∈
Σ0n. Assuming that G is classically represented by G
′ in Σn (induction hypothesis),
then F is classically represented in Πn+1, because ∀xG is classically equivalent to
∀x(⊤ → ‖G′‖) which is in Πn+1.
If F ∈ Σ0n+1, then F is classically equivalent to a formula of form ∃xG, where G ∈
Π0n. Assuming that G is classically represented by G
′ inΠn (induction hypothesis),
then F is classically represented in Σn+1, because ∃xG is classically equivalent to
∃x ‖G′‖ which is in Σn+1. 
Remark 4.7. As can be seen from the proof of the previous proposition, a for-
mula of the classical arithmetical hierarchy is actually classically represented in
the intuitionistic hierarchy essentially by its representation in the classical hierar-
chy. For example, if F ∈ Π04, then F is classically equivalent to a formula of form
∀x∃y∀z∃uE, which is in Π4 because ‖∀x∃y∀z∃uE‖ = ∀x(⊤ → ∃y∀z(⊤ → ∃uE)).
In other words, formulas in prenex normal form and with alternating quantifiers are
9To distinguish easily between the classical and the intuitionistic hierarchy, the levels of the
classical hierarchy are denoted in regular face and with a 0-superscript, while the intuitionistic
ones are in bold face and have no superscript.
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represented by (essentially) themselves in both the classical and the intuitionistic
hierarchy.
As for the plain inclusion of the intuitionistic arithmetical hierarchy in the clas-
sical one, Σn ⊆ Σ
0
n and Πn ⊆ Π
0
n, it does not follow either: although isomorphism
implies intuitionistic equivalence and hence classical equivalence, because of Re-
mark 4.4, we cannot prove the inclusionΠn ⊆ Π
0
n (and hence Σn ⊆ Σ
0
n) in general.
However, for the class of formulas in the prenex normal form Q1 x1Q2 x2 · · ·Qn xnP ,
for Qi ∈ {∀, ∃}, Qi 6= Qi+1, and P a prime formula, the inclusion does hold.
Proposition 4.8. Let F be in the prenex normal form Qn xnQn−1 xn−1 · · ·Q1 x1P
with alternating quantifiers (i.e., Qi 6= Qi+1 for all i). Then: if F ∈ Σn, then
F ∈ Σ0n; if F ∈ Πn, then F ∈ Π
0
n.
Proof. We first prove that, given a formula G such that ‖G‖ ∈ Π (i.e., in C), we
have that ‖G‖ = |G|.
The proof is by induction on the structure of G. Because ‖G‖ ∈ C, the cases
where G is a disjunction or an existential quantifier are not possible. For the base
case G = p, and the induction cases G = G1 → G2 and G = ∀xG1, the definitions of
‖‖ and || are identical, so there is even no need to invoke the induction hypothesis.
There is only one induction case left to treat.
G = G1 ∧G2: Note that both ‖G1‖ and ‖G2‖must be in C, because otherwise,
by the definition of ⋉ , ‖G‖ would not have been in C. We have ‖G1‖ ⋉
‖G2‖ = |G1|× |G2| by the induction hypothesis and because ⋉ = × when
both arguments of ⋉ belong to C.
Now, we can prove the proposition, by well-founded induction on n ≥ 0:
base case: In the base case, F is of form P , and we have P ∈ Σ0∩Σ
0
0∩Π0∩
Π00.
induction case: Suppose that the proposition holds for n and that we want
to show it for n + 1. We consider the two possible cases for the quantifier
Qn+1.
(1) Suppose ∃xn+1G ∈ Σn+1, i.e., ‖∃xn+1G‖ ∈ Σn+1. We have ‖∃xn+1G‖ =
xn+1 ∝ ‖G‖ = ∃xn+1 ‖G‖, by the definition of ∝ , since ‖G‖ ∈ C
because G is either P or starts with a universal quantifier. From
∃xn+1 ‖G‖ ∈ Σn+1, we have that ‖G‖ ∈ Πn, so G ∈ Πn and, by
induction hypothesis, G ∈ Π0n. Therefore ∃xn+1G ∈ Σ
0
n+1.
(2) Suppose ∀xn+1G ∈ Πn+1, i.e., ‖∀xn+1G‖ ∈ Πn+1. G is either P
or starts with an existential quantifier. If G = P , then ‖∀xn+1G‖ =
|G| xn+1= ∀xn+1(⊤ → P ) ∈ Πn+1 implies P ∈ Σn (in this case,
n = 0). If G = ∃xnH , then ‖∀xn+1G‖ = |G| 
xn+1= ∀xn+1(⊤ →
∃xn |H |) = ∀xn+1(⊤ → ∃xn ‖H‖) ∈ Πn+1 implies ‖H‖ ∈ Πn−1 i.e.,
H ∈ Πn−1; here we were able to use the equation ‖H‖ = |H |, because
‖H‖ ∈ C since H is either P or starts with a universal quantifier.
We have got either P ∈ Σn or H ∈ Πn−1 and, by using the induction
hypothesis, we get either ∀xn+1P ∈ Π
0
n+1 or ∀xn+1∃xnH ∈ Π
0
n+1.

We can now prove that the intuitionistic arithmetical hierarchy, and hence the
more general intuitionistic formula hierarchy, is proper.
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Corollary 4.9. For n ≥ 0, Σn ( Σn+1, Σn ( Πn+1, Πn ( Σn+1, and Πn (
Πn+1.
Proof. We will prove only one of the statements, Σn ( Πn+1, as the proofs of the
other three are analogous.
Let F ∈ Π0n+1 \ Σ
0
n. Such a formula exists by the properness of the classical
arithmetical hierarchy.10 By Proposition 4.6, F is classically represented in Πn+1
by a formula F ′ ∈ Πn+1. This F
′ will be our example of a formula in Πn+1 \Σn.
We also know that F 6∈ Σ0n and hence F
′ 6∈ Σ0n. Since by the proof of Proposi-
tion 4.6 F ′ is in prenex form and with alternating quantifiers (see Remark 4.7), from
Proposition 4.8, we have that F ′ 6∈ Σn (we used the (constructive) contraposition
of “F ′ ∈ Σn implies F
′ ∈ Σ0n”). 
4.2. Examples of using the intuitionistic hierarchies. In this last subsection,
we give two examples that show our hierarchies at work. In the first example, we
categorize the formulas of the well known Nishimura lattice. In the second one,
we show how the hierarchy allows one to simplify definitions that are stated by
induction on the structure of formulas, concretely the double-negation translation.
The first example is an application of the intuitionistic arithmetical hierarchy (it’s
propositional fragment), while the second is an application of the formula hierarchy
directly.
Example 4.10 (Nishimura lattice). The basic formulas of the Nishimura lat-
tice [14, 15] is the following sequence of formulas:
F∞ := 1 F0 := ⊥ F1 := p F2 := ⊥
p F2n+3 := F2n+1 + F2n+2 F2n+4 := (F2n+1)
F2n+3 ,
(43)
for n ≥ 0.
This sequence characterizes all propositional formulas of intuitionistic logic that
use at most one prime formula, p, in the following sense:
• any formula is equivalent to one of the basic formulas;
• no two of the basic formulas are intuitionistically equivalent to each other;
• only the following intuitionistic implications between basic formulas hold
(and the intuitionistic implications that follow from them):
F2n → F2n+1 F2n+1 → F2n+3 F2n+1 → F2n+4 F0 → F2.
So, for the case of propositional intuitionistic logic restricted to one prime formula
p, the basic formulas of the Nishimura lattice form a kind of a hierarchy. In the fol-
lowing diagram, we classify them in our intuitionistic arithmetical hierarchy, while
at the same time marking the implications that hold between the basic formulas.
10The proofs are constructive, that is, there are explicit such formulas – again, one can see
Section 2.3 of [8] for concrete examples.
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F0
F1
F2
F4
F3
F5
F6
F8
F7
F9
F10
F12
F11
F13
· · ·
· · ·
Σ0,Π0 Π1 Σ2 Π3 Σ4 Π5 Σ6
Calculating the level of a formula is an easy application of the normalization func-
tion ‖·‖. Only the propositional part of the hierarchy is needed for this example,
and therefore the normalization procedure from Figure 1 suffices. The symbol ⊥ is
treated just as any other prime formula by the normalization function. As a general
rule, we get that:
Πn ∋ F2n, F2n+2 for odd n ≥ 1; Σn ∋ F2n−1, F2n+1 for even n ≥ 2. (44)
The characterization of the basic formulas regarding (non)-equivalence that was
proven by Nishimura provides us with examples of:
• pairs of non-equivalent and hence non-isomorphic formulas at each of the
levels Σn (n-even) and Πn (n-odd) of the intuitionistic arithmetical hier-
archy – showing that each of those levels contains at least two formulas
(exactly two formulas up to intuitionistic equivalence);
• examples of formulas for each of Πn+1 \ Σn (n-even) and Σn+1 \ Πn
(n-odd) – showing that each of those levels of the hierarchy is a proper
extension of the previous one: an example formula cannot be in both levels
because, when a formula is in a higher level, since it is not intuitionistically
equivalent to any other basic formula, it cannot be isomorphic to any other
basic formula, and in particular it cannot be isomorphic to a formula at a
lower level.
Note that, although no special interpretation of ⊥ needs to be assumed in order to
classify the Nishimura formulas in the intuitionistic hierarchy, we do have to make
the same assumptions as [14] for the examples of non-equivalent formulas from the
previous two bullet points: the assumption of usual intuitionistic interpretation
of ⊥ and the assumption of formulas being constructed from at most one atom p
(besides the atom ⊥).
Example 4.11 (Double-negation translation). Consider the double-negation trans-
lation F⊥ of formula F ,
F⊥ := (F⊥ → ⊥)→ ⊥
P⊥ := P P -prime
(F ∧G)⊥ := F⊥ ∧G⊥
(F ∨G)⊥ := F⊥ ∨G⊥
(F → G)⊥ := F⊥ → G
⊥
(∃xF )⊥ := ∃xF⊥
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(∀xF )⊥ := ∀xF
⊥.
This translation is known as the call-by-value translation, a version of the Kuroda
translation that also works in minimal logic (i.e., the ⊥-elimination rule is not
needed to establish the soundness of the translation).
Now consider the following translation, derived from the above one by consider-
ing only formulas in normal form, e ∈ Σ ∪Π – since any formula can be brought
to normal form, the translation is applicable to all formulas.
e⊥ := (e⊥ → ⊥)→ ⊥
p⊥ := p p-prime
(∀x1(c1 → b1) ∧ · · · ∧ ∀xn(cn → bn))⊥ := ∀x1(c1⊥ → b1
⊥) ∧ · · · ∧ ∀xn(cn⊥ → bn
⊥)
(c1 ∨ · · · ∨ cn)⊥ := c1⊥ ∨ · · · ∨ cn⊥
(∃xc)⊥ := ∃xc⊥.
The advantage of using normalized formulas instead of general formulas in this
definition of double-negation translation is double:
(1) Instead of considering six general cases when defining (·)⊥ in the original
double-negation translation, one case for each logical connective, we only
need to consider four specialized cases in our version of the translation;
although, one does now have to work with a synthetic and “vectorized”
logical connective for the case covering ∀ and →;
(2) In our translation, we can get away with not adding a double negation after
the universal quantifier: this works because formulas in normal form are
guaranteed to have an implication below the universal quantifier and the
equivalence between ∀x¬¬(F → ¬¬G) and ∀x(F → ¬¬G) is provable in
intuitionistic (minimal) logic.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we employ the exponential polynomial aspect of formulas to study
the structure of proofs and formula equivalence, allowing a fresh perspective on
intuitionistic proof theory and a first link to other areas of computer science and
mathematics, which one could potentially exploit to obtain new results in logic.
Indeed, as we saw, seeing proof rules as relations (inequalities) between expo-
nential polynomials allowed us to define HS. As far as we know, this is the first
proof formalism for intuitionistic logic that dispenses with invertible proof rules.
We thus believe it to be a contribution to the study of identity of proofs [1], an open
problem identified already by Kreisel [16] and Prawitz [17]. Investigating whether
HS-notation alone is enough to define identity of proofs is a topic of future work. In
a related published work [10], we have studied the equational theory of =βη for the
lambda calculus with sum types (i.e. intuitionistic natural deduction), after terms
are coerced to a type normal form very similar to the one shown in Figure 1. A
new decomposition of the so far standard identity of proofs relation of βη-equality
is proposed there, from which one can also see that the permutations of invert-
ible rules are an obstacle for comparing derivations, and that a natural deduction
calculus is less suitable than a sequent calculus for studying proof identities.
The idea that invertible proof rules of sequent calculus should be treated in
blocks, inside which the order of application of rules does not matter, is present
in the approach to focused sequent calculi such as Liang and Miller’s intuitionistic
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system LJF [7], inspired by previous work on linear logic by Andreoli [18]. The dif-
ference between our approach and LJF is that working on the top-most connectives
of a sequent (formula) does not allow one to apply all applicable type isomorphisms
as sequent transformations, and, as a consequence, a focusing proof proceeds in an
alternation of invertible and non-invertible blocks of proof rules – the invertible
rules still being present.
As we have shown, all the rules of the HS calculus are interpreted as strict in-
equalities of natural numbers when atoms are instantiated with appropriately cho-
sen values. Because our exponential polynomials are manifestly monotonic when
interpreted as functions (i.e. if f(x) is an exponential polynomial containing the
variable x, and n ≤ m, then f(n) ≤ f(m)), one might consider allowing the appli-
cation of the inference rules in Figure 2 not only at the top level of the sequent,
but also deeply inside the formulas themselves. This could lead to a deep infer-
ence [19] calculus in the style of G4ip. Moreover, because of the aforementioned
monotonicity, it should be possible to extend the results of Section 3 to ensure
that this calculus is terminating as well. Note that intuitionistic calculi presented
as deep inference systems (see e.g. [20]) usually have an explicit contraction rule,
which precludes such a termination argument.
Compared to more traditional sequent calculi, HS is maybe closer to Vorob’ev’s
original calculus [21], that contains distributivity proof rules (i.e. (6)), than Dyck-
hoff’s [2] and Hudelmaier’s [22], which do not apply such proof rules.
Furthermore, we showed that the inequality interpretation allows us to formulate
a simple termination argument for proof search in intuitionistic propositional logic.
This could be potentially useful for automated and inductive theorem proving, but
it is not the subject of this paper to go into details of how to actually perform proof
search.
The formula hierarchy from Section 4 appears to be the first systematic classifi-
cation of first-order formulas preserving isomorphism. One could also argue that it
is among the simplest hierarchies for intuitionistic logic so far and analogous to the
classical arithmetical hierarchy. Our hierarchy could also be used as an alternative
one in the context of classical logic, however, the benefits of preserving isomorphism
of formulas in the classical setting are not clear, as, at this moment, it is not clear
whether there is a meaningful (non-degenerated and non-trivial) notion of proof
identity for classical proof systems (see sections 5 and 6 of [1]).
Previous intuitionistic hierarchies that we know of are the ones of Mints [23, 24],
Leivant [25], Burr [26], and Fleischmann [27]. Mints’ hierarchy of formulas is re-
stricted to ones not containing existential quantification (in a positive position);
given this restriction, every formula in a level Σn or Πn of Mints’ hierarchy is
classically equivalent to a formula in the classical arithmetical hierarchy at the
corresponding level Σ0n or Π
0
n. With the aim of showing complexity bounds on
termination of proof search, the line of work on Mints’ hierarchy has recently been
continued by Schubert, Urzyczyn, and Zdanowski [23]. Leivant defined formula
classes for intuitionistic logic based on implicational complexity, that is the depth
of negative nestings of implications. Burr proposes a formula class Φn, that over
classical logic coincides with the class Π01 of the arithmetical hierarchy, however he
gives no “reasonable counterpart” for the classes Σ0n when n ≥ 2. Fleischmann
introduces inductive operators for universal, U(·, ·), and existential, E(·), closure of
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sets of formulas, showing they can be used to obtain a number of different hierar-
chies, one of them coinciding with Burr’s hierarchy, and then uses these operators
to obtain model theoretic preservation theorems. It is not clear how to obtain our
hierarchy using Fleischmann’s operators, in the form in which they are given; also,
our hierarchy classifies formulas while preserving their isomorphism, not only their
equivalence.
It might also be interesting to notice a connection with the class of coherent
or geometric formulas [28]: using our notation, they can be written in the form
(x1c1+ · · ·+ xncn)
p1···pm ∈ C, where ci ∈ C do not contain implications (except for
trivial implications of the form b1).
Finally, as we saw in Section 4, the formula hierarchy gives a normal form for
first-order formulas, which can be used to simplify definitions or arguments that
proceed by induction on the structure of formulas. One could perhaps also see this
normal form as an intuitionistic analogue of the prenex normal form.
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